Everything suggests that the leading political parties ÔÇô the ruling Botswana Democratic party and the opposition Botswana National front ÔÇô have gravitated towards each other, and a good way towards the right or conservative end of the political landscape. Right and left here will be positioned in the first instance, in relation to the polarities represented in the western capitalist world view and its eastern socialist counterpart. Needless to say, this polarity is best mirrored in the relationship between west and east at the height of what the western journalists called ‘the Cold War’ before the ‘collapse of the eastern bloc’ around 1989-1990. In Botswana, the political opposites might have been represented in the political programme of the Botswana Democratic Party, unapologetically aligned to western capitalism and the Botswana National Front, which, at its formation soon after independence, gave all the appearances of an eastward leaning to socialism. The parties have finally danced themselves into the comfort zone where both are comfortable with the agenda of the other. Rather, there appears to be something of a political honeymoon that has enabled both to rid themselves of the ‘radical’ elements on their respective ‘lefts’, and to marry, much more comfortably than ever before, their rightist elements. The BDP, umbilicaly tied to capitalism and governance modelled along the lines of crude British democracy, has stayed committed to that position in the run up to self government in 1965, to date. It has shifted lazily, and somewhat clumsily, only to allow some cosmetic liberalisation in the direction of social democracy as it attempted to adapt to modernisation of capitalism as it evolved towards what is now known as ‘globalisation’. The Botswana National Front, formed out of the frustration of the early activists of the parties that agitated against backdoor colonialism to which the BDP had succumbed, has steadily but very certainly gravitated towards the right, further right, and even more right, until it became difficult to distinguish it from its adversary of early independence years. Its founding inspiration, Dr Kenneth Koma, theorised only in whispers in the 1980s that the fundamental problem of Botswana was that of the combined ‘ills’ of feudalism and imperialism. This he said on a trip to Thamaga, in the company of former BDP Mayor of Gaborone and then administrative secretary in the central committee, Wellie Seboni, and in the presence of the then reigning Mayor of Gaborone, Paul Rantao. The de facto leader of the BNF, contrary to the rhetoric of the leading propagandists of the early Front ÔÇô Lenyeletse Koma, Frank Marumo, Mareledi Giddie, O.K. Menyatso and the youthful James Olesitse ÔÇô persisted in toning down, perhaps even abandoning the anti-imperialist and socialistic posture of his lieutenants going towards the historic climb of the organisation to the position of leading opposition party in 1984. Then the BNF overtook the Botswana People’s Party as the leading organisation of the opposition, gaining five members of parliament and domination of the Jwaneng and Gaborone councils. The debunking of the socialist political angle in favour of the more non-committal potion of ‘social democracy’, combined with apparent gains at the polls, gave the leaders of the BNF, the followers, and Koma, the impression that progress was on hand. Indeed, it was. The Democracy Project of the University of Botswana and Swaziland, external political observers and journalists credited the BNF with the status of ‘a credible alternative government’. Between 1984 and 1994, the BDP moved swiftly, with good advice from its South African consultants and the British and American diplomats, to adopt the All-Party Conference which would discuss the independent electoral commission, reduction of the voting age to 18, old age pensions, institution of the national identity card ÔÇô something of a relic of the moribund Soviet Union ÔÇô free education and several other reforms, most of them within the reach of the BDP. The size of revenues resulting from a prospering diamond trade abroad, in addition to the growth of the construction industry, generated enough capital to sponsor the additional political reforms. The ruling party adapted and adopted the proposed reforms without compromising neither its traditional ideological positions nor its competitive edge at the polls. Astute gerrymandering to suit the ‘first past the post’ electoral system kept the BDP well ahead of the BNF, giving rise to calls for the more equitable system of proportional representation, which the ruling party wisely avoids to this day. On the contrary, adoption of the proposals of the BNF deprived that party of its ‘freedom square’ topics, also blurring any significant ideological contradictions that might have existed between the parties. Put another way, the parties began to drift towards an identity that could only have painted the BNF in the same colours as the BDP. The gains of the BNF at the polls, at the cost of the loss of the vigour of the socialist rhetoric in the early years, sowed pockets of discontentment among the veterans who gained the least from the ideological concessions that were made. Quitting, resignations, purges and formation of parties that represented the various fragments of interest groups within the BNF became part of the political programme of the organisation. The BNF gave birth to 10 or more opposition parties, all of which adopted the traditions and bad habits of the BNF:-
ÔÇó Blurred ideological lines; neither capitalist nor socialist, everything to everybody, all in the name of a strange strain of ‘social democratic revolution’ that must nevertheless be compatible with western economic and political interests ÔÇó Vigorous pursuit of ‘parliamentarianism’ so that the leading elite of the party should get to either parliament or council seats ÔÇó Hostility towards broad based debate coupled with reverence for ‘star’ leaders, accompanied by gossip, backbiting and Mafia-like personal vendetta. These bad habits play out in primary elections and unprincipled causes that discuss colleagues rather than causes ÔÇó Fanatical parochialism and worship of idols that gets in the way of cooperation with like-minded people and organisations. ÔÇó Wanton misuse of party resources, and unwillingness on the part of the party elites to make personal sacrifices for the good of the organization.
The fruit of this manner of opposition politics are reflected in the 2004 national election results. Despite a voter generous turnout of over 75 percent, increased elective parliamentary seats at 57, and pervasive fatigue with BDP rule, the ruling party got 44 seats, the BNF salvaged 12, and the BCP managed one. The figures show, as they always have, that the BNF polled more than half of the BDP vote. Under a system of proportional representation, the BNF might have attracted close to 20 seats. Under that system, the combined opposition vote would not have beaten the BDP, but it would have come very close. That is all theory. The opposition in general, and the BNF and BCP in particular, have demonstrated a phobia for simple arithmetic, despite their admitted ideological affinities. Like gangs in a small neighbourhood, each refuses to shed its tattoos and gold chains, preferring unproductive skirmishes with the police, when they might have united to form a development cooperative away from crime, in order to serve the larger community. In a recent interview, a Botswana Peoples Party publicist proclaimed that their stand on opposition unity was straight forward: “Dissolution of all parties and amalgamation under one,” he told Btv. The BNF, basking in the waning glory, reserves its right to the brand that has almost lost its glitter, while the BCP, much like the congregations of the Nigerian evangelical churches, hold their palms out as they relate their testimonies to the British Labour Party, believing that some miracle will happen to make the BDP go away. Both parties are well aware that, even if they had failed at amalgamation, cooperation would have won them more seats than they lost on account of the votes they shared. In the end, the figures, after the event, serve the academics better than they serve the politicians. The opposition politicians have proved themselves deaf, dumb and blind, disinterested in taking advice, talking to each other and to mediators, or seeing the reality for what it spells out. This could be costly, in 2009, which falls on the wrong end of the electoral cycle where the opposition parties ÔÇô at least since 1984 ÔÇô generally do well. The opposition did better in 1984 than it did in 1974. It did better in 1994 than it did in 1989 and not as badly in 2004 compared to 1999. If there is any value to that observation, 2009, will not be a good year for the opposition or the electorate, which performs best when there is a real prospect of a change of government they can believe in! There is likely to be a lower voter turnout to the advantage of the ruling party; perhaps a repeat of the 1979 scenario which Kebatlamang Morake explained away: “The people did not turn out in large numbers because they are quiet content with the BDP,” he said at a post election symposium at the University of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. The international credit crunch will provide the BDP with an overarching election theme that will account for any failures in any sphere of governance. Opposition supporters are tired of losing. It seems then, that the most viable option for the electorate ÔÇô particularly the opposition voters – will be to abandon the party, and look out for good candidates. The good candidates will be the ones that call for: –
ÔÇó Abolition of the army in ten years and integration of the Botswana Defence Force into the Botswana Police Service. This will save money, and avert the threat to democracy of soldiers who imagine themselves as benevolent dictators. ÔÇó Privatisation of RB II. Transformation of Daily News, Btv, BOPA, the Government Printer and RB into genuine public media or joint venture on a 50-50 basis between the government and others inside three years. Protection of Kutlwano as a state publicity organ. This will save money and bolster free and fair dissemination of information whilst affording the government to pronounce in the public interest. This must go together with legal enforcement of the right of the public to unadulterated information, and enforcement of self-regulation of media workers through their trade unions. A Media Development Trust will be established to assist Batswana who wanted ownership in the private, public or community based media. ÔÇó Integration of the ‘Central’ and ‘local government’ administrations to facilitate streamlining of education, health and education. This will provide for greater oversight over projects, and make local govern more accountable to local communities. ÔÇó Recognition of ethnic group rights at a political, social and economic level, thereby making integration a feasible project. This will avert disputes at the CKGR, and guarantee real benefits to communities at the mining towns of Jwaneng, Orapa, Selebi-Phikwe, Gantsi and Francistown. ÔÇó Abolishing all school fees up to Form V and make attendance compulsory. This will reduce destitution, crime, AIDs. ÔÇó Diversification of economic links of the country in the direction of China, India and the larger Asia, and strengthening of ties with Latin America alongside a vigorous campaign for trade with Africa. ÔÇó Rebuilding of the Botswana family of father, mother and child and encouraging sexual, moral and social habits that support it, even as there shall be recognition of variations on the recommended model. There will be legally enforced ownership of children by mother and father, equally, who shall get state assistance according to need for the first three children. ÔÇó There shall be de-commercialisation of the legal profession to eliminate enhancement profiteering at the expense of access to justice for the average citizen. ÔÇó There shall be abolition of ‘Ntlo ya Dikgosi’ and strengthening of community-tribal-district administration as shall be determined by the peoples there resident with respect for ethnic diversity and equality. This will permit Kings and Queens to administer tribal law as their people understand it where they are located without the burden of practising as quirk lawyers. This will also assist with conflict resolution in families, petty crime and the upkeep of the productive elements of custom and tradition.
In the transitional period when the voters will elect according to the competence of the candidate rather than party allegiance, it will be important to improve the means by which voters can hold the parliamentarians and councillors accountable for the manner in which they vote at the National Assembly and at the councils. A party worthy of the responsibility of forming an alternative government will emerge.
