As I read the Watchdog column of the Sunday Standard which suggested that the opposition talks were to all intends and purposes over, I could not help but marvel at how one of the key proponents of the creation of an alternative to the BDP has been quick to give up on attempts to forge together such an alternative.
In my view there is still a way of moving forward for the opposition. The start point is to realize that the opposition has accepted that elections will take place in 2014. There is therefore time to achieve policy convergence. There is ample time for the opposition to come to some agreement on their policy thrust. This is important because Batswana are not looking for different faces but different policies to better their lives.
If in the final analysis there is not significant difference in policy between the opposition and the BDP there can be focus on priorities, mechanism and process for delivery. There is no reason to fear a situation where we find that the opposition cannot put forth different policies from the BDP. From my observation of various democracies it is not easy to come up with policies that are radically different from each other in national governance.
It has always been a mistake to focus on distribution of constituencies before achieving policy convergence. In my view it does not make sense to put in place resources before achieving policy convergence. The shift from constituencies to policy convergence helps the opposition to create breathing space, and also allows them, should the need arise to abandon cooperation efforts, to rely on policy differences to justify failure of the talks.
The focus on distribution of constituencies creates a platform for accusations of focus on egos rather than substance. The opposition boasts of a rich and deep variety of experts in all fields of governance. It should therefore not fear putting forth these people in the forefront to come up with a policy thrust that can be sold as an alternative to the BDP. It seems to me that all the opposition has to do is temper their rich personnel resources with modesty.
A focus on policy convergence takes us away from distribution of constituencies which is really a stage for legitimizing exercise of power. By fighting for constituencies without having achieved policy convergence the opposition is creating rigidity prior to exercise of government power. It is for the opposition to justify to the nation why it is important to ensure that the legitimizing issue must precede policy formulation and convergence.
If the opposition focuses on achieving policy convergence before distribution of constituencies, it will take the wind from under the sails of those who are opposed to cooperation on the basis of policy differences. As things stand this unresolved issue is a safe haven for detractors and policy purists. Policy convergence helps identify a common center in which case detractors become extreme ends of the policy thrust. It is then easier to deal with what would otherwise be those on the extreme right or extreme left of the policy thrust.
The apparent failure of the opposition talks can in my view be attributed to the opposition’s failure to manage the BDP split. Instead of seeing the BDP spilt for what it was, a physical rather than an ideological split both BNF and BCP failed to appreciate that they needed to achieve policy convergence with BMD. They saw the BDP split as a numbers game. They failed to see that the split was not an election process.
The failure to realize that the BDP split was not an election process ensured that both BNF and BCP failed to appreciate that the BDP split was in the future and that the BMD was just a seed upon which both BNF and BCP were to nurture an alternative policy vision to the BDP. Had the BNF and BCP understood that the BDP split was in the future they would have realized that the issue of constituencies was irrelevant at this stage.
Our private media houses are also largely to blame for the apparent failure of the talks. They have been at the forefront in focusing on the issue of constituencies as if that was the only real issue about opposition cooperation. Even the Watchdog Column having suggested that a BDP split was the way to an alternative never really appreciated that the split was to serve as a catalyst for an alternative.
The BMD’s Botsalo Ntuane also suggested on various occasions that the fall of a long term ruling party was always preceded by a split in the party. Unfortunately he also failed to realize that what was required was a new vision and not just a numbers split. The BMD’s insistence on incumbency is ultimately borne out of a failure to appreciate the need for a policy convergence. The pursuit of incumbency is part and parcel of the flawed step of distributing constituencies before achieving policy convergence.
The opposition must also realize that Rre Khama has demonstrated in the past to have the ability to emerge stronger out of a skirmish. Even the Watchdog Column suggested that BDP was on the ascendancy. In a situation where your adversary is on the rise the last thing you need is loss of your own ground. Most importantly you need to buy time to regroup. In my view the opposition cannot afford to break apart and regroup later. They can achieve the same, buy time, but changing tact. Their best bet is to give prominence to policy formulation.
Of course a focus on policy convergence may result in an end to some political ambitions, but leadership entails sacrifices. I have in the past suggested that maybe fate has decided that the current leaders of the opposition would only serve the role of being catalysts to a process of forming an alternative vision for Botswana. An old man of GaMmagwato once told me that “ modiri ga se moji”. I am not aware of an English equivalent, but the statement means that it is not always the one who puts in the effort who gets the reward.
Sometimes I get a feeling that I waste topics, headings. I once wrote an article entitled “Has the time for a sacrificial lamb arrived?” I regret wasting that heading. In my view now is an appropriate time for that heading. Our young leaders may have to be sacrificed for the sake of an alternative vision. If they cannot have the courage and wisdom to see that policy convergence takes precedence over distribution of constituencies then we may have to sacrifice them to give this a chance, and save the process of formulating an alternative vision for Botswana.
Rre Ntuane has already effectively come out in support of what I am putting forth, by the proposition that where there is convergence between what the BDP and the opposition aspire for, there is no need to generate a difference. Why is it so difficult to apply the same principle to opposition cooperation? The error is in formulating a wrong premise, that the opposition must retain the seats that it holds. The issue is not about retention of what are ineffective numbers. The issue is about putting it all on the line in order to give a new vision a chance.
The opposition must also have a healthy respect for Rre Khama. His meeting with Rre Ntuane should be seen for what it actually achieves. It has already generated mistrust of Rre Ntuane in some opposition members. I suggest that it also creates mistrust between Rre Ntuane and Rre Motswaledi. A meeting between Rre Khama and Rre Mabiletsa will achieve the same, mistrust between Rre Mabiletsa and Rre Boko. I know they can say no such mistrust can happen. But can Rre Ntuane and Rre Mabiletsa never find themselves duty bound not to disclose certain things to people who are not elected members of parliament?
In my view for so long as the opposition remains captive to the ineffective numbers that they have in parliament, and ignore the reality that at least two leaders of the opposition are outside parliament, and that they are therefore vulnerable to self doubt, and that Batswana have decided who rules Botswana between now and 2014, they will fail to see that at issue is the creation of an alternative for Batswana. An alternative cannot be held captive to preservation of ineffective numbers, more especially where such preservation creates doubts within the opposition itself. Our opposition leaders must learn to let go of a minority position.
In the final analysis the Watchdog’s pronouncement on the collapse of the opposition talks is premature. What we are seeing is failure on a collateral issue. We are seeing the opposition failing at an issue that they should not even be involved in at this stage. They need to get their priorities right. Their priority is to formulate an alternative policy vision or in the event that they cannot, or that they realize that there is no need for a policy shift, an alternative policy implementation and development delivery process.
