After losing successively to the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) and with no hope of ever beating a well-oiled political machine that enjoyed the financial support of the world’s major diamond company (De Beers), some Young Turks in the Botswana National Front (BNF) felt that time had come to “go to the bush.” At this point in time, black South Africans were still fighting for their independence from a brutal apartheid regime and against the wishes of President Sir Ketumile Masire, used Botswana as a launch pad. On account of the latter, Botswana was awash with weaponry courtesy of African National Congress and Pan African Congress military wings. In one too many instances, BNF members operated safe houses where these weapons were kept. The reasoning of the BNF Young Turks was that the weapons in their custody were more than adequate to launch an armed struggle against Masire’s government.
However, ultimately, it was party leader, Dr. Kenneth Koma, who had the final say on the matter. While he had led the BNF to every election under Masire and lost each one and while he had formed a view that the BDP was cheating in the elections, Koma flatly refused to endorse the idea of going to the bush. That Masire was his brother-in-law (Koma’s brother married Masire’s sister) may have been a factor but in the broader scheme of things, Koma couldn’t countenance the idea of turning Botswana into another African killing field.
Years later, Palapye MP, Boyce Sebetela, would say on the floor of parliament that Botswana’s opposition should be acknowledged for its immense contribution to the country’s peace and stability. His elaboration of that point was that unlike other African leaders in their position, Botswana’s opposition always believed that the ballot was better than the bullet.
This reminiscing is relevant at a time that Resego Kgosidintsi, a senior BNF official and one who wants to go up the ladder by vying for a central committee position, has been hauled before the magistrate court for inciting violence. A message posted to her Facebook page reads as follows: “I am taking initiative together with other young women to organise a march this week, a go big or go home kind of march against gender based violence. Friday everyone must be on the streets, on the roads, outside of their offices, outside of classrooms, with their placards and petrol bombs and protest against the inaction of the BDP-led government. Buildings will burn, cars will not move, our lives are at risk 24/7. No one must sleep. President Masisi will not sleep.” The police later determined that this message contravened the Penal Code.
In fairness to all parties involved, the message was not posted on behalf of the BNF. That said, there is no looking past the fact it was posted to a page administered by someone whose political activism draws energy from her membership of the party, that the party didn’t censure her actions but came to her defence and that party leader, Duma Boko, will represent her in an upcoming court case. This set of facts implicates the party in the use of violence.
Boko is relevant to this story in another very important dimension. During the 2011 national strike by civil servants, he publicly stated that it was in order for members of the public to “beat up” police officers. Beyond the legal aspect, this statement also raises the question of whether police officers (a significant voter bloc) are welcome in the BNF.
Preaching violence – as Boko and Kgosidintsi do – represents a dramatic departure from a party norm that was explicitly expressed as policy by Koma through a foundational BNF document called Seforanta ke Eng? The BNF founder idolised Ho Chi Minh, leader of the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP) of Vietnam. Ho wrote “The ABC of the Vietnam Revolution or the Road to Revolution’ in which he spelled out the desirable traits of a revolutionary. Koma followed suit by publishing a similar book he titled Seforanta ke Eng? More than anything else, the latter stresses the need for attributes like respect and compassion in a revolutionary. Seforanta ke Eng? would certainly have factored in Koma’s decision to reject the proposal to wage armed struggle against Masire’s government.
It so happens that a party that still invokes the memory and legacy of Koma is also now home to digital-realm Brown Shirts who call themselves Fear Fokol – “fear f*&k all”, meaning fear nothing. Fear Fokol, whose factory settings are stuck on “defend Boko at all costs”, doesn’t fear even Seforanta ke Eng? and among those who have been on its receiving end is an elderly Botswana People’s Party leader. While not physically violent, Fear Fokol uses violent language and some of its most vociferous cadres thought nothing of insulting the BPP leader on Facebook.
Against the very precise guidance that Seforanta ke Eng? provides on treating others with respect, Boko has himself publicly used insulting language. The most notorious example was at last year’s presidential debate on Btv when he likened BDP leaders to small, hairy wild animals and used a slew of colourful epithets reserved for a special class of social misfits. Taking cue from Boko, Kgosidintsi wrote, in a Facebook post that Sunday Standard would repost, that she would have added “dioshit!” to one of the epithets (“rankurata”) that Boko had used on the debate stage. “Dio” is an early rendering of “your” by Batswana of yesteryear who had an infirm grasp on the English language in a society that was fast being anglicised. Now used only colloquially, the corrupted word has been handed down through generations and is apparently always paired with an insult.
To be perfectly clear, we are not making any substantive value judgement on whether what Boko, Kgosidintsi and Fear Fokol are doing is right or wrong – that is a separate issue and one we are not addressing here. The historical record shows that in the course of their evolution, political parties and movements have embraced violence – and justified why they have to do so. In October 1962, the African National Congress convened a consultative conference at Lobatse, right here in Botswana, whose main objective was to “consider the measures required to give a new impetus to organisational work in pursuance of the decision to make preparations for armed revolutionary struggle.” If today’s BNF wants to depart from the peaceful revolutionary struggle that it was founded on and wants to discard Seforanta ke Eng? as a foundational party document, it should be transparent about it. In service of the latter and for the sake of all concerned parties, it should made a definite and public policy pronouncement. Those who joined the party on account of its policy on peaceful revolutionary struggle have a right to know whether the party now embraces violence. Members who are also police officers deserve to know whether it is now party policy to have them beaten up as party of the struggle.
Ultimately, this is a policy issue because an organisation of BNF’s size, age and calibre can’t operate by word of mouth. It is also a governance issue with transparency as the main focus: any change in long-standing party policy has to be communicated in clear, unambiguous terms.
