Botswana has been dubbed the “African miracle.” The country appears to be an exception that some ‘praise-scholars’ describe as a ‘deviant’ or a ‘special case’ compared to the rest of Africa. While most of Africa has been described as political and economic disaster zone, Botswana is said to stand out as democracy that has had a rapid economic growth for more than four decades.
The country has been praised not only for maintaining a multiparty system and high growth rates but also for its supposedly good governance record. In contrast to other African countries, the extent of corruption and mismanagement, which runs counter to good governance, is said to be low.
A plethora of studies have been conducted on the political and economic development of the country, all stressing its “exceptionality.” With Stedman (1993), terming it ‘the Switzerland of Africa’, and Moore (1998:109) remarking ‘explaining Botswana’s exceptionalism is a small academic industry’. Abdi Ismail Samatar for his part stated that Botswana has eluded the rampant corruption and mismanagement that bedevil most Third World countries.
The country is seen as a heaven of prosperity and stability in a region full of economic and political misery. Indeed, Botswana’s development path has been remarkable, particularly in the African context. Since independence, the country has retained a multiparty system, with free (but not so fair) elections held on a regular basis.
Botswana has also generated high economic growth rates, driven by the exploitation of its vast diamond resources. With an average annual rate of 7.7 percent from 1965 to 1998, the country had the fastest economic growth worldwide (Acemoglu et al. 2003: 80; Harvey/Lewis 1990).
Most fundamentally, Botswana’s government has earned a reputation for “clean” governance of public resources (e.g. Nord├Ñs et al. 1998). Good governance is seen as the fundamental reason for Botswana’s positive political and economic record. As to how Botswana sustained such a spectacular growth and success remains a puzzle, because clearly studies on Africa have shown that good economics have proved not to be politically feasible.
The NGO Transparency International has consistently rated Botswana the least corrupt of all African countries included in its Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI). Accordingly, the World Bank’s Governance Index has awarded favourable ratings with respect to the “control of corruption.”
It has repeatedly classified Botswana as belonging to the third of countries with the lowest incidence of corruption (Kaufmann et al. 2005). The Bertelsmann Transformation Index country report on Botswana comes to a similar conclusion.
The latest rankings of African Presidents described Botswana’s President Lt General Ian Khama as an ‘African Democratic Darling’ (ADD). He has been described as a ‘democratic sweet heart’ who has been taking deliberate steps to improve foreign relations as he visited Japan and Cuba in the year 2010.
Whilst Africa has continued to be perceived as a scar on the conscience of the world with Botswana being an exceptional case, the country has however, also attracted considerable attention in an attempt to demystify the mistaken identity of being a ‘special case’. Different scholars have argued that whilst ‘sunlight is the best disinfectant’ in the words of Louis Brandeis, (1914), this has particularly not been the case with Botswana.
Their arguments are mainly premised on the falsification and presentation of Botswana as a beacon of democracy and free from corruption.
They further submit that Botswana’s political system does not fully qualify as a ‘liberal democracy’ in the sense of Merkel and Croissant but instead partly displays features of an ‘exclusive’ or ‘delegative democracy’ (Merkel eta l, 2000, Merkel 2004:49-50). In addition, despite being a parliamentary system, Botswana’s polity is highly centralized and is dominated by the presidency.
The constitution bestows all executive power to the president, while the cabinet only advises (Republic of Botswana 2002: art. 47 (2), 50 (2).
Today, thanks to the efforts of Transparency International and other organizations, there is considerable ‘sunlight’ on well known types of corruption. Although, Botswana has continued to fair well on Corruption Perception Index (CPI), Mo-Ibrahim index and World Bank’s Governance Index amongst other things with favorable ratings, corruption has not been absent in Botswana. Serious scandals involving high-level corruption and the misuse of state resources first erupted in the 1980s and 1990s (See Seleke, Sunday Standard, 16 -22 Jan 2011).
Corruption has continued to raise its ugly head more particularly involving Botswana’s political elite and their close family members. It is alleged by Holm (1988) that in the mid 1980s several persons obtained more than one farm under a government scheme to support agriculture. This was done through abuse of the Tribal Grazing Lands Programme (TGLP) which was introduced to provide one farm per person interested, but however, former president Quett Masire’s brother received at least three.
According to Holm, the cabinet refused to take action “because of the potential embarrassment”.
Irregularities again emerged with the scandalous land deals that culminated in the Kgabo Commission 1991, the IPM saga (1991), the BHC debacle, (1992), the near ruination of NDB (1993), the Botswana Cooperative Bank saga due to insider lending, the BAMB scandals which implicated G M Five, a company associated with Sir Ketumile Masire with a loan outstanding of P578 676 in September 1993, dating back to December 1986 and said to have never been serviced and the FAP.
The near ruination of NDB at the hands of some bigwigs and close family members was just a tip of an iceberg. It is reported that on noticing the rampant abuse of the credit system at the bank by political bigwigs and their close family members, the employees did not want to be out done. They obtained staff loans which eventually totalled over P7m.
It was free for all, a mannar from heaven, the end results being the laying off of close to 50% of the entire bank staff and their posts being made redundant. Thus meaning workers having to sacrifice and pay by losing their jobs.
BHC suffered the same fate at the hands of some BDP ‘political vultures’ that had landed on its terrain. This culminated to Presidential Commission of Inquiry into its operations chaired by Richard Christie. The Commission revealed corrupt tendering practices involving collision between Board members, a government minister, and top management of the corporation on the one hand and construction companies on the other.
It also identified gross mismanagement and dishonesty in BHC. The findings revealed that one of the Directors of Spectra Botswana, Assistant Minister of Local Government Michael Tshipinare was granted an unsecured loan of P500, 000.00 and thereafter its parent company, the Premier Group of South Africa, made a successful tender bid to construct a new headquarters for BHC at allocation of P53 Million. The findings also revealed that Spectra also received P12m to build the new BHC headquarters before the contract was finally cancelled in 1992.
The Christie report also revealed that the other Assistant Minister of Local Government, Ronald Sebego was found to have used his position for the benefit of his friends by allocating them houses whilst there were some 20,000 on the formal waiting list for housing. Ironically even after such scandals were presented and accepted by both Parliament and Government, Sebego still maintained his innocence and in his words stated the following ‘ I don’t think I did anything wrong, and I don’t take the blame for not detecting problems at BHC’ (Good, 1994).
There was also the Lisindi Commission which was appointed by former President Festus Mogae to investigate allegations of corruption and maladministration at BOTEC. BOTEC was in a state of paralysis and staff had complained that BOTEC was turned as a cash cow for private consultants who acted in cahoots with those in management to do consultancies, the fruits of which were never enjoyed by the organization.
According to Mmegi 2 Feb 2006, the name of a company owned by the former Minister of Communications Science and Technology, Boyce Sebetela continued to crop up during the inquiry into the financial and administrative irregularities and corruption at BOTEC. During the inquiry the then head of computer engineering at BOTEC, Suthani Mazhani admitted that the then Minister of Communications called a meeting in which he suggested that BOTEC should install photocopiers, fax machines and internet in their Community User Information System (CUIS) project.
It was apparent that PC Net – Sebetela’s company – provided these suggested resources. Mazhani told the commission that the minister summoned them to his office to get a brief on the community projects. (Mmegi, 2 Feb 2006).
The survey of the literature on the ‘corruption Tsunami’ of the 1980s to the 1990s that bedeviled the country show very little recordings on corrupt practices, insider trading, conflict of interest and maladministration. As a result of that, it is not puzzling why Botswana became to be perceived as an African enigma, a democratic darling different from war torn and disaster zone Africa.
The Sunday Standard of the 19 -25 December 2010, however, brought about spectacular new revelations regarding the mystery that surrounds BDF tenders that were awarded to BDP leaders, Cabinet Ministers and their close relatives between 1990 and 2000. The Minister of Presidential Affairs and Public Administration, Lesego Motsumi could not even explain to parliament how several companies owned by leaders, friends and relatives of the ruling BDP, which won tenders to supply BDF with vehicles, uniforms, food, and boats knew about these tenders since they were never advertised.
Motsumi revealed to Parliament that during the time in question, companies belonging to ruling party bigwigs, including President Ian Khama’s brothers among others supplied BDF with vehicles (Sunday Standard, December 19-25, 2010).
The new revelations on allegations of corruption clearly demonstrate that Botswana is not in any way unique when compared to its African counterparts. Like the deadly cancer corruption has continued to spread. To illustrate, in S v Elridge Mhlauli a former Permanent Secretary was charged and convicted on corruption charges involving the allocation of land housing the “River Walk Mall” in Gaborone. Mhlauli however, successfully won his appeal. There has also been the case of S v Louis Nchindo, a former Managing Director of Debswana, the giant diamond mining conglomerate jointly owned by the government of Botswana and De Beers.
Despite being the Chief Executive of a key conglomerate, Nchindo was accused of acquiring land in Gaborone ostensibly in the context of the company’s diversification project when in fact he acquired it for his own personal benefit. Apparently the former State President, Festus Mogae, had endorsed the transaction but claimed that he was not aware of any improprieties.
Even more starling is the marathon case involving President Ian Khama’s cousin and former Minister of Defense, Justice and Security Dikgakgamatso Seretse and his alleged failure to disclose to the President his involvement with RFT Botswana.
Another not so isolated case is President Ian Khama’s ‘helicopterism’ which showcases that Botswana’s political and economic elite has made use of public resources for particularistic ends.
However, despite such evils, the government is used to hearing its praises sung widely and more particularly now and living one with no option but to wonder ‘is this a club government’.
*Thabo Lucas Seleke teaches Public Policy at the University of Botswana.
