It is now common knowledge that some members of opposition parties have always demanded that opposition parties find ways to cooperate at general elections in order to avoid vote splitting and hobble the recalcitrant Botswana Democratic Party (BDP).
Whereas there have been many attempts at opposition cooperation or unity such have always proved elusive. Nevertheless, the voting fraternity never got tired of calling for opposition parties to cooperate in order to bring an end to the BDP dominance.
An overriding theme to explain the failure of opposition parties to cooperate has been that such efforts were driven by people who were active in party politics, especially the leaders of the opposition political parties.
The explanation is that previous opposition cooperation initiatives were spearheaded by people who were most likely to place their personal interests ahead of group interests hence would not want to forfeit their chances at leadership or other positions that would enable them to consolidate their powers in the opposition family. Basically, party representatives went to the negotiation table to defend their positions and/or secure deals rather than focus on issues relevant to members and citizens at large.
This perspective holds that previous cooperation initiatives were largely dependent on the role of played by and the behavior of key political figures in ways that made the efforts personalized and potentially tailored to meet the ambitions of opposition elite.
Given the adversarial relationships between opposition political actors and their preoccupation with securing deals for themselves such as winnable constituencies, the approach meant that the project got off from a false start and nothing could be more fatal than have a false start in attempting to make sworn rivals work together in building an alternative government.
It was against this realization that independent actors pushed for things to be done differently in order to avoid similar pitfalls, hence the opposition cooperation negotiations that commenced in 2011 were spearheaded by members of the civil society.
It is important to note that these particular talks at opposition cooperation were in response to the clarion call by public sector trade unions whose members had embarked on a long public sector strike demanding salary increments.
In a culmination of events relating to this historic public sector strike, public sector trade unions committed themselves to supporting opposition parties at the next general election in 2014 on condition that the parties were in cooperation of some sort.
To this end, it is safe to say that while the formation of the UDC was never a walk in the park much credit should go to the trade union movement for making opposition parties transcend self-interests and see the bigger picture.
While some parties and individuals overrated their role in the eventual germination of the UDC, there is no denying that the use of conveners who were unaffiliated to any political party, unbiased and unencumbered by personal ambitions was perhaps a master stroke, an immeasurable breakthrough.
The other explanation for the successful birth of the Umbrella for Democratic Change (UDC) is that the trade unions had threatened to field their own members if the opposition failed to work out a promising electoral arrangement for purposes of pooling votes together and reducing excessive party fragmentation that often gift victory to the BDP.
It is difficult to believe that negotiations for cooperation would have been successful had they been driven by partisan politicians mainly because while opposition leaders may appear to share the same vision of ending the BDP’s rule, they however remain deeply hostile to and exceedingly distrustful of one another.
This high level of hostility and distrust makes it difficult for leaders to compromise even on the smallest things. Essentially, opposition parties have entrenched fears of being swallowed by others such that cooperation efforts are often viewed with extreme suspicion.
Under these circumstances and also taking cognizant that it is natural to pull the blanket to one’s side, the UDC should have retained the role of conveners and perhaps even constitutionalized this role and save it posterity. This is so because indications are that the number of opposition parties will continue to increase implying the need for more frequent negotiations with possibilities for soaring tensions especially in relation to consideration of applications for membership of UDC by BDP’s splinter groups with their toxic politics.
A viable and tenacious electoral coalition can never be born out of incoherent collection of some desperate comical parties hastily cobbled together for the sole purpose of seizing state power.
Coalitions should never be reduced to hurried acts of assembling desperate parties that wish to pool meager resources and aggregate existing support in their desire to capture state power. Coalitions are by their nature fragile because they so often have the effect of undermining the reputation and institutional capacity of participating parties in the short term and long term.
Whereas coalitions may be born out of the common goal of regime change and so readily identifiable by their anti-regime brand, the reality is that this hurried and personalized approach reduce the coalition to a poorly assembled scrap car for the personal ambitions of certain individuals.
What is now apparent is that when efforts to unify opposition parties are directed by individuals who are active in party politics rather than by conveners, the negotiations are generally characterized by resentment from the onset mainly because opposition parties consist of old foes who are expected to become new allies overnight.
It is also important to note that almost all of our political parties are knitted around their leaders’ personalities rather than a distinguishable institutional identity making them the private property of the leaders. In that case, negotiations that are headed by party activists would necessarily have to be anchored on the self-interests of the parties’ superintendents at the expense of party interests.
Thus, the use of party activists in negotiations to explore possibilities for forging an electoral coalition is like a race on a slippery highway and presents fertile ground for political prima donnas and/or dominant parties to impose their preferences and adulterate or ultimately hijack the project with devastating consequences.
It is noted herein that at the conclusion of negotiations for the formation of the original UDC, the BNF was accorded the privilege to lead the coalition perhaps because the BNF was seen as an established brand in opposition trenches, the only tried and tested outfit at the awfully disorganized show and a trademark of endurance.
Whereas the BNF is a household name, its organizational capacity is distinctly weak as to ruin its value and image as a natural leader of any opposition cooperation venture. Relatedly, the BNF has always relied on the charisma of its flamboyant leaders who often used intimidation and Machiavellian tactics to consolidate their power and ring fence their stay at the helm.
In spite of its common affliction with chaotic politics, there is little doubt that the BNF deserves commendation for its commitment to opposition politics and its craving for state power. It is also fitting to give some credit to the BNF for the formation of the much adored UDC.
It is a fact that the BNF has sacrificed a lot of resources and emotions in the UDC project, in the process transforming the competitiveness of party politics in Botswana while also renewing hopes of bringing to an end BDP dominance since independence.
That said, there is a growing realization of the need to reconstruct and reinvent the UDC before it becomes an acclaimed symbol of failure. The UDC first competed at the 2014 general election and performed exceptionally well.
In the subsequent general election in 2019, when voters were expecting the coalition to whitewash the ruling BDP, the UDC performed dismally, crushing voters’ hopes and discrediting the general principle that opposition coalitions increase chances of regime change.
It may appear unfair to dismiss and characterize the UDC as an exaggerated, over-romanticized failed project that is sure to increase voter disillusionment over the lack of genuine alternatives to the ruling party, but a coalition is not like a single entity opposition party that would have been formed to compete for state power forever. Coalitions are formed to have immediate impact failing which their viability is quickly doubted.
It is an unfortunate stroke of coincidence that a reinvention of the UDC has to bring the BNF into the game plan and right in the thick of it by virtue of its dominant role in the UDC. Essentially, the role of the BNF either in engineering or jeopardizing the UDC is fundamentally the epicenter of the coalition’s volcanoes.
In fact, the UDC has acquired the messy institutional appearance of the BNF often using polarizing rhetoric to not just attack the BDP, but also denounce other opposition groups that demand accountability and transparency in the management of the coalition.
Thus, any honest efforts to refresh the UDC and stop it from becoming a repeat failure will have to be directed at scaling down BNF’s toxic influence in the coalition.
