The leader of the Umbrella for Democratic Change is still dead serious that 2019 General elections were stolen from him and his party.
He has been almost shiftless on that point since October 2019.
There is little doubt that this assertion alone very easily gets under the skin of Boko’s chief opponent, president Mokgweetsi Masisi.
On this point he reserves his biggest ire, not for Masisi but for the intelligence services – the DIS.
So far it looks like it is a storyline he intends to take with him to the next elections.
Will it alone be enough to win an election in 2024? I remain skeptical.
Other detractors have argued that Boko has stuck doggedly to this line principally because he is impervious to the political mood of the day.
It might well be that something improper happened during the 2019 elections.
But for him to be so dogged, yet with so little evidence coming forward, will with time prove counterproductive.
Duma Boko should seriously consider moving on. And with that also adopt a new strategy.
He should tackle other key factors that contributed to UDC 2019 loss – especially those factors that are beyond doubt. BNF lost because BNF underperformed.
For example there is no doubt that president Mokgweetsi Masisi was in 2019 able to significantly rally the swing voters behind him and his Botswana Democratic Party.
He had very good talking points.
There was simply no contest. Many first time voters simply believed him.
For many of them he represented a break with the past.
He was for them a breath of fresh air.
He was believable. He spoke their language and seemed to address their key concerns and also allay their overriding fears at the time.
He seemed to be a simple man who was untailed by the evils often associated with money.
He seemed to represent everything that his predecessor Ian Khama was not.
Masisi spoke the rule of law. He spoke job creation and waxed lyrical about Botswana being in the cusp of the fourth industrial revolution.
He said he wanted to bring back a long gone value system of who Batswana are.
Botswana’s foreign policy was isolationist, he said.
And that had to change.
He spoke passionately about fighting corruption all its facets.
His decision to sack Isaac Kgosi was a masterstroke. The decision was music to the ears of those who yearned for a total break with the past.
And people could easily relate with him. For many of them he was a messiah who could walk on water if he wanted.
In contrast, Boko consorted with Ian Khama. And openly embraced with him.
For many people this was unpardonable.
Clearly Boko hoped to tap into Khama’s popular support as a traditional leader.
This did not sit well with many BNF loyalists.
They wanted Ian Khama gone away from their lives and took opprobrium at Boko for seemingly trying to bring Khama through a back door.
Boko had misread public appetite for change and with that inevitably underestimated the public anger at Ian Khama even as he had he left office.
The public anger was by all means understandable.
What is important is that Boko and the BNF got entangled in a milieu they could avoid.
This brings us to yet another elephant in the room that the UDC leader should confront.
Over and above the swing voters, there is also no doubt that many traditional voters of the Botswana National Front opted to ditch the party and instead vote for Masisi in 2019. This cohort consisted BNF card carrying members, but also those that consider themselves BNF even without carrying a membership card.
These people constitute a bulk of BNF popular vote.
The reason why BNF underperformed the UDC, and almost lost all constituencies under its management was precisely because the party forfeited this lot.
Catching up was never going to be easy even among its heartlands because BNF voters did not stay away they jumped across to vote the other side.
Boko can still extricate himself from all this. At face value it should be easy because Masisi is yet to deliver on his key electoral pledges.
But Boko has to accept that there is no moving forward for him without winning back the core BNF traditional voters and card carrying members that deserted him in favour of Masisi in 2019. These two blocks are immensely crucial for him and his BNF. But the UDC can also not take power without them.
By and large these voters are ready to get back to the BNF. But they need reassurances that Boko will not simply slide into his 2019 ways that they so emphatically rejected.
A stronger BNF has the potential to quell the endless disunity and bickering that characterize relations inside the UDC.
There is a feeling, not altogether unfounded, especially among some members of the BCP who still begrudge their party’s presence inside the UDC that the BNF is ready for the picking.
This view is not entirely correct. When BNF followers voted for Masisi in 2019 it was not a vouch of allegiance. It was simply a protest vote.
Conditions allowing those people will be back with BNF and in fact still constitute a part of the party’s most strident adherents. They just need convincing that their concerns have been listened to and have indeed been addressed.
Boko can start by admitting that notwithstanding his allegations of election rigging there were other much bigger problems insider the BNF in which he played no small part.
Election rigging charge has many advantages.
But it is no substitute for election winning strategy.
In a way the charge is an easy and convenient way to deflect the blame away from himself.
The charge shields Boko from blaming himself for losing elections.
It also shields him from blaming the BNF electorate for disloyalty and for choosing somebody else.
More broadly and should we say structurally, the same charge entrenches a reluctance at party level to take responsibility and call for broad changes.
But in the end the charge underplays the BNF’s ability to reinvent itself.
While charge invokes self-pity, to a detached and more skeptical watcher, the charge makes the BNF look like a helpless sitting duck that cannot stand up to the ruling Botswana Democratic Party’s wily machinations.
More to the point its utility and efficacy is totally inadequate and cannot be sustained for long – certainly not to 2024.
Sticking much longer to it, without proffering evidence risks making Boko look cavalier. And that cannot be right.
Many of the BNF voters that deserted their party in 2019 were exceedingly sophisticated people from the middle class ranks.
They are very loyal to the BNF, but more patriotic to the country.
Boko’s job, if he decides to come clean will be to engage with the,
That task is made easier by the palpable disillusionment against Masisi. Potentially, the BNF remains a huge force. But it is to be fair a stagnant one exactly of the decision by the cohort described above to turn against the party they still consider their own.
Boko should be humble enough to face BNF members with a contrition in one hand and a new strategy on the other.
His and their decision have conspired to make the BDP look invincible, which is by itself a big and attribution that is in the main ultimately false – created chiefly by their leader.
