Recent media reports indicate that the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) chairperson, Samson Moyo Guma, is lobbying to be the country’s Vice President after the 2014 general elections. While some within the BDP have labeled Guma as dangerously ambitious, and threaten to vote him out at the party’s forthcoming special congress, others have indicated preference for Dikgakgamatso Ramadeluka Seretse and Onkokame Kitso Mokaila, ministers for Defence, Justice and Security and Minerals, Energy and Water Resources respectively.
Ostensibly, those opposed to Guma’s ascendancy to the vice presidency cite his defection to the Botswana Movement for Democracy (BMD), which he also served as Treasurer, as the unforgiveable sin. This should be no reason since Guma was recently elected chairperson, President Seretse Khama Ian Khama’s deputy at party level, when the same BDP members knew full well of that fact.
In this article, it is argued that such opposition is predicated on four main strategies, namely the preservation of the Khama and Seretse dynasty, militarization, centralization of the presidency and the constitutional amendment.
Under the preservation of the Khama and Seretse dynasty strategy, Khama will ensure that his cousin, Seretse, becomes the next Vice President and succeeds him when he retires. Thereafter, Khama’s younger brother, Tshekedi, currently the Minister for Environment, Wildlife and Tourism will be Seretse’s vice, and upon Seretse’s retirement, Tshekedi will ascend to the presidency while Anthony becomes his vice.
Under the militarization strategy, Khama will ensure that he is succeeded by a former army officer, and while there are several such, Seretse and Mokaila are front runners. Khama’s preference for these two is evidenced by the trust he showed in them by appointing them to head two key ministries.
Under the centralization of the presidency strategy, Khama will ensure that whoever becomes president comes from the central district or at least the southern part of the country. It follows that the beneficiaries of this strategy will be Seretse, Mokaila and the Khama brothers. 
If the aforestated strategies fail, for example, because Seretse and Mokaila fail to be regents for the Khama brothers, Khama will lobby for the amendment of Botswana’s constitution to allow him to continue beyond the two term limit to allow his brothers, especially Anthony, to mature politically for direct succession.┬á
Therefore, that the BDP has no succession plan is an artifice. The lacuna, if any, was strategically created to achieve succession through covert means as was the case when Khama himself resigned from the military and became vice president the following day.┬á Khama’s claim that those who want to succeed him should express their interest is disingenuous because he knows nobody will do that lest they are denigrated and labeled as vultures.
In view of the aforegoing, therefore, it is unlikely that Guma, a civilian and Kalanga/Ndebele from the northern part of the country, can be permitted to ascend to the vice presidency. It may be recalled that when Guma first stood for Parliament his adversaries within the BDP used the allegation that he originates from Zimbabwe to discredit him.
The opposition to Guma’s ascendancy to the vice presidency is, therefore, not based on the BMD’s defection. It is based on the aforestated clandestine strategies, but mainly, the centralization strategy. Bluntly put, it is motivated by tribalism, the very reason such political stalwarts as David Magang, Daniel Kwelagobe and Ponatshego Kedikilwe were denied the presidency. The latter was only appointed Vice President when Khama had little choice after Lieutenant General Mompati Merafhe, a retired army general and a MoNgwato from the central district, resigned due to ill health.