I thought the Khama presidency would see the value of religion in politics. In contrast, the Khama regime chose toughness and worked closely with conservative traditionalists, appointing a traditional chief to head a commission meant to revive cultural values (the creation of new values was not on its agenda and the strengthening of religious values was marginalised). The result of a system based on toughness was that traditionalists in the Kgatleng district supported the Khama regime’s toughness by introducing their own independent tough measures characterized by the banning of churches they dislike and the beating of priests they consider disloyal to the chief, the banning of shebeens (beer drinking spots) (this only encourages underground drinking) and the introduction of traditional rites. Bangwato are on the verge of re-traditionalising by introducing similar rites. Thus, just like so many failed African societies, the new Botswana that President Khama championed is on the verge of re-traditionalising. Modernization, new values to match globalization, and religion, are being de-emphazised in the emerging Botswana.
In contrast, Machiavelli observes in the Discourses that imposing discipline in a peaceful manner (particularly through religion) achieves greatness.
And as the observance of religious teachings is the reason for the greatness of republics, in like manner the disdain of the practice is the cause of their ruin; for where the fear of God is lacking a [state] must either come to ruin or be sustained by the fear of a prince who makes up for the lack of religion. And since princes are short-lived, it is most likely that a [state] will fail as quickly as the abilities of its prince fail; thus, states which depend upon the ability of a single man cannot last long, for such ability disappears with the life of the prince; and only rarely does it happen that this ability is revived by a successor’ (Bondanella and Musa, 1979: 209).
For Botswana, the country has reached a point where the fear of its prince has long gone and where the fear of God has not been emphasized and has not taken root. The political scenario of mid 2011 characterised by a long drawn labour strike could easily lead to ruin of the country.
I further drew attention to Karl Marx who qualified Machiavelli by cautioning against any state religion or any state culture which occupied the status of ‘state religion’, or ‘ stateculture’. Such impositions not only discriminate against minority religions and cultures, but compels the state to behave like a theologian and to threaten freedom. Marx warned that freedom is preserved if the state freed itself from religion and culture by not imposing a state religion or culture. This means that religion and culture properly belong to civil society and not to the state.
The political emancipation of the Jew, the Christian, and religious man in general implies the emancipation of the state from Judaism, Christianity, and religion in the manner peculiar to its own nature by emancipating itself from the state religion, i.e. by not recognizing, as a state, any religion, by affirming itself simply as a state (Marx On the Jewish Question, quoted in Waldron, 1987: 138-9).
Where the state acts as a theologian, freedom is threatened as priests get beaten and churches banned. This is the disdain and the absence of the fear of God that Machiavelli warned against, equating it with the symbol of ruin. This means that freedom is preserved if religions and cultures properly belong to civil society where they are allowed to expand freely and to attract many members in the society. In that regard, the state is required to be secular, and to create conditions allowing civil society to practice diverse religions and cultures. This means that religious and cultural diversity should be protected by the state and should be allowed to flourish. ‘The political state has just as spiritual an attitude to civil society as heaven has to earth. It stands in the same opposition to civil society and overcomes it in the same manner as religion overcomes the limitations of the profane world, that is, it must likewise recognize it, reinstate it, and let itself once more be dominated by it’ (Marx, 1987: 140-41).
Just as Divinity freed itself and withdrew from men (leaving men choice to sin or to be righteous on earth), the above quotation means that the state, should be indifferent to all religious and cultural practices. Where religious and cultural practice threatens harm (as it does not do so most of the time), a secular state gives citizens choice to find another religion or another church, or the state resorts to the judiciary where each party states its part of the story and is listened to by impartial judiciary officers, or to self-governing oversight bodies constituted by the participating organizations.
I drew the Khama presidency to Judith Andre (1995: 193-4) who observed that the law must be limited in matters of religion and culture for the following reasons: first, religious claims by their very nature cannot be settled by vote nor by political bargaining. Secondly, religion should be kept largely independent of political power because religion is an independent source of meaning and self-affirmation. It has been a sanctuary for the disenfranchised and the persecuted’. This means that political principles of voting and bargaining are unsuitable for resolving religious differences and challenges. It also means that religious truth is completely different from political truth, and the two should be treated as two separate spheres. However, while religion cannot be adjudicated politically, it can be adjudicated socially. Judith Andre (1995: 94) writes that:
‘But though the law must be limited, society has more scope…social pressure is fearsome. When honours are corrupted, exchanged for money, or for favours, then gossip, public outcry, and organized resistance can come to the rescue. When friends are false, other friends may sound a warning. When religion grows corrupt there is likely to be a reformation or an expulsion’.
Thus, corrupt religions incite public outcry from society and reformations from within, leading to revival. This what Machael Walzer calls democratic citizenship. In contrast, it is state politics in Botswana that incite public outcry. Beastly state politics that either closed all government schools or opened them without offering any teaching, its insistence on firing some workers who participated on the strike, is generating public outcry that may easily lead to a full blown revolt.
What started as the most feared and the most potentially productive regime has turned out to be the most opposed and most beleaguered. How did this reverse happen? Many authors (including Good, Taylor and others) mistakenly assumed that Botswana’s civil society was too weak and would not stand up to any dictatorship. It seems the Khama presidency believed such authors. Ironically, opposition against dictatorship swelled within the BDP itself, particularly the Kanye Congress that elected an overwhelmingly Barataphathi central committee, with Khama as the only one from the other faction. It was that Central Committee that sought to check Khama’s powers and started the ball rolling, questioning his perceived unilateralism and seeking legal opinions against him. It should be remembered that this happened at a time when the private media and its organizations such as Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA-Botswana) had already started their own campaign against the media Act of 2008, refusing to participate in oversight structures set up by the government. It also happened at a time when the public sector unions that had started unionizing, called for the speedy implementation of the 2008 Public Service Act tin order to stop the forced retirement which the government was speedily implementing against its employees.
The public service trade unions had also started to openly identify with the Barataphathi faction and with other opposition parties, and became actively involved in the 2010 elections, including their issuance of posters of five men (including Vice President Merafhe) whom they accused of being a danger to democracy. The entry of public sector trade unions into politics emboldened civil society organizations such as BOCONGO that had already opposed the creation of a larger intelligence organization, and started organizing breakfast talks on the ‘State of the Nation’ address.
By the time the Khama regime won the 2009 general election, it was already facing serious ideological challenges. Its vision of Botswana characterized by a completely militarized state in which retired and serving soldiers controlled all the institutions of the state, a completely loyal citizenry whose private life was strictly controlled by the state and by traditional authorities, a public workforce that was sufficiently intimidated, obedient and weary of protests and demonstrations, a religious community that practically praised the political leadership and participated in enforcing state-sponsored morality (not religious morality), was under serious questioning. President Khama, known for his not too friendly attitude towards the media, was nowhere to defend it. Observers such as Log Raditlhokwa noted that President Khama was not sufficiently visible and did not come up with a philosophy for his vision. A vision anchored on discipline without a public philosophy to sweeten it and to make it legitimate, exposed its naked dictatorial tendencies which came to define it. Fears of authoritarianism and the desire to challenge it, galvanized the resistance movement which started calling for constitutional reforms.
*Maundeni is Professor of Political science at the University of Botswana
