I want to start by thanking Bugalo Maripe for his observations and reminder that Botswana runs a hybrid system, combining parliamentary and presidential elements. This is a point I emphasised in my book – Transparency, Corruption and Accountability in Botswana (2008). My focus on Matlho-a-Phage, was not on defining the Botswana system, but on how it should be reformed. The question is, should it be reformed in a parliamentary fashion or in a presidential fashion. To some people, it does not matter. All they are calling for are reforms, no matter whether they damage our parliamentary side of the hybrid. Unfortunately, past reforms (as I will show below) strengthened the executive at the expense of parliament. My thinking is that reforming the Botswana system by introducing direct presidential elections is not a parliamentary, but a presidential, way of reforming it. It helps to empower the presidential side of the hybrid. To help us understand this point, I appealed to ideal models. My intention is, to present two ideal reform systems, so that each improves the Botswana hybrid in its own manner. If the Botswana system is a hybrid, consisting of parliamentary and presidential elements, how should it be reformed to strengthen our democracy?
My bias is towards reforming the system in a parliamentary way. That is, to identify all presidential components in the system and reform them in a parliamentary manner. I left presidential-oriented reforms to the BCP man who brought the issue of electing the president. (Apparently he has many supporters at UB). My argument is that electing the president directly, is reforming the system in a presidential way. But reforming the Botswana system towards presidentialism would only help to strengthen the executive. This is the gist of my presentation.
In contrast, reforming the Botswana hybrid system towards parliamentary democracy would make the executive more embedded in, and accountable to, parliament. Actually, the Botswana Constitution regards the president as an MP, entitling him/her to speak and vote. This parliamentary aspect has been corrupted through presidential-oriented reforms that promoted presidentialism, enabling the president to avoid having to answer questions, and to choose his vice as leader of the House for that purpose. This past reform made the president feel less of a parliamentarian and more of a president, detached from parliament.
If our intention is to strengthen parliamentary democracy, it is one of the things that constitutional reform needs to resuscitate, to demand that the president be the leader of the House and to field questions in parliament. The President should be the Leader of the House, and should face a question time where he should be required to answer questions directly. This is one reform that could strengthen the parliamentary-side of the hybrid system as it would make the President more accountable to Parliament. Our current system of drawing cabinet from parliament is a parliamentary practice. It is meant to position Cabinet as the first committee of Parliament. If reforms are to be made here, the intention must be to make it more visible that cabinet ÔÇô which consist of the president, vice president and ministers ÔÇô is the first committee of parliament A lover of parliamentary democracy (of which I am one) would prefer that the president should have a constituency just like any other MP. (Seretse Khama actually had a constituency and was voted twice in that regard). If cabinet ministers can play a double role of being minister and MP, so too can the president. If the president loses his constituency, then he cannot become president. This would allow Parliament to direcly elect the President. In contrast, separating the President from Parliament through presidential elections and drawing cabinet outside parliament (as some reformers suggest) promotes presidentialism. It would make Botswana more presidential than parliamentary. Moreover, such separation has the potential to create a dictatorship.
It would need an elaborate system to contain dictatorial inclinations from any sitting president. Automatic succession was a presidential-oriented reform that strengthened presidentialism. It made the President (with the connivance of parliament) the sole authority to choose the presidential successor. Automatic succession denies parliament the voice to determine the successor. For instance, when parliament approved President Mogae’s choice of vice president in 2008, it knew he was appointing his own successor, who indeed ascended to the throne. In contrast, the Botswana parliament used to elect the successor if the incumbent failed to finish his/her term. For instance, when President Seretse Khama died in office, Vice President Masire did not automatically take over. Parliament elected him (within seven days as required by the Constitution then), not necessarily because he was the sitting vice president. The system was reformed in a presidential manner around 1997, removing parliament from the picture of filling a vacancy in the presidency, and authorising the President to choose his own successor. My argument is that a parliamentary-oriented reform would abolish automatic succession, reinstate the old position that allowed parliament to vote a presidential successor in case of death or otherwise, and help improve parliamentary democracy. A successful Vote of No Confidence, is a parliamentary element of the Botswana system. The constitution requires that if Parliament successfully passes a Vote of No Confidence, the President shall either resign or dissolve Parliament, and call for fresh elections.
Resignation by the President is a parliamentary element. In contrast, dissolving Parliament in the case of a successful Vote of No Confidence, is a presidential element that constrains the actions of Parliament. It was used threateningly by President Mogae who threatened to dissolve Parliament if it rejected his choice of Ian Khama as vice president. To reform this law in a parliamentary manner, the constitution should only require resignation of the President, so that Parliament can re-constitute itself for the purposes of electing a new president. What is emerging from this essay, is a bias against reforms that strengthen the presidency. I would not want to see Botswana reforming towards presidentialism. Unfortunately, all those that seek to reform the Botswana system so far, are inclined towards presidentialism (automatic succession, Presidential elections, drawing cabinet outside parliament) under the mistaken impression that they are actually strengthening parliamentary democracy. I strongly believe that you can only improve parliamentary democracy in a manner parliamentary, by embedding the president in parliament, by allowing parliament to choose the presidential successor in case the incumbent cannot finish his term, by making the president speak and vote in parliament, by making the president the leader of the House and so on. In contrast, reformers in manners presidential, are already many and will defend that system. My duty as I see it, is to suggest parliamentary reforms. I hope this contribution will spark debate that will help to enrich our parliamentary-side of the hybrid.
Maundeni is Professor of Political Science at the University of Botswana
