Festus Mogae paced the floor of the cluttered office next to the Parliament Members Lounge like a caged animal. His sluggish footsteps suggested that he was carrying a huge burden on his shoulders. He turned to the opposition Botswana National Front (BNF) Chief whip, Otlaadisa Koosaletse, to help him out of trouble: “I am on my own. You know I cannot count on the support of BDP members of Parliament”, he said. It was a strange confession from a man who would become the president of Botswana the following day. As it turned out, Mogae’s presidency would be full of such desperate moments.
“Mogae told me not to listen to all the rumours swirling in the parliament corridors. He then asked me to promise that I would support his choice for Vice President. I had no problem with that because I knew his choice was Magang”, recalls Koosaletse.
Next on Mogae’s lobby list was BNF Vice President Michael Dingake. As Dingake recalls, the president-in-waiting ranged through the lobby like a moving target. “He told me that ‘give every man thy ear but few thy voice’”. Dingake did not know what to make of the wisecrack from the pages of William Shakespeare’s classic “Hamlet.” Like Koosaletse, he was sure that Mogae’s first choice for Vice President was Magang.
David Magang was also convinced that he would be the next Vice president of Botswana. History had marked him out as the country’s next probable No.2. Magang had befriended Mogae at Moeng College in the 1950s.
Magang had been the best student in all of the Bechuanaland Protectorate, with Mogae coming second. The two shared textbooks as Magang could not raise money to buy his.
For a year, as a freshman at a British college, Magang shared a bedroom with Festus Mogae, the man who would be sworn in as president of Botswana in two days. For six years they shared a classroom, starting at Moeng College all the way to Form Six in England.
Even the numbers were humming along: All Botswana National Front (BNF) 13 members of parliament had joined ranks with 23 members of the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) Big Five faction, making him a clear favorite for the Vice Presidency.
It was about this time that Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) Secretary General, Daniel Kwelagobe, confided in Mogae’s confidante, Louis Nchindo, that he was worried Magang was going to be the next vice president. The reason for Kwelagobe’s apprehension was the close friendship between Magang and the man who would be taking over from Masire.
Nchindo retorted that, “if that is the way you look at it, then Gobe Matenge has a better chance. He is closer to Mogae than Magang.”
Magang’s situation was, however, complicated by a clutch of papers in Mogae’s “Pending” tray: a consultancy report by Professor Lawrence Schlemmer commissioned and paid for by De Beers with the cajoling of Louis Nchindo. The report recommended that to heal the BDP rift and shore up the party’s fortunes in the next elections, Mogae would have to appoint someone with a strong character who has not been tainted by BDP factionalism and from outside the party structures. De Beers, however, had a problem with Magang who had been fighting shrill, high-pitched battles with the diamond mining giant over diamond beneficiation.
There was also talk of nocturnal meetings between Mogae, Nchindo (De Beers’ point man in Botswana,) and Botswana Defence Force (BDF) commander, Lt Gen Ian Khama, at Nchindo’s place in the suburbs of Gaborone Central. Two days before Mogae ascended to the presidency, Lt Gen Khama announced his resignation from the army. In a trade where no one puts much faith in blind coincidences, the meeting between the trio and Khama’s resignation convinced a number of party insiders that the army commander would be trading his military tunic for the red, black and white BDP colours.
After the meeting with Dingake, Mogae then called in Kenneth Koma, the BNF President. In the best traditions of Botswana’s Vice Presidential campaigns, the next phase of Mogae’s lobby remains obscure. The BNF’s best-laid plans to make Magang Vice President, however, went off the rails.
Both Dingake and Koosaletse say they do not know exactly what transpired between Koma and Mogae in the small office next to the parliament lounge. Somewhere in the fog, perhaps there was a double cross. Certainly there was a change in plans, and a new name officially entered the contest for the Vice Presidency.
Recalls Koosaletse: “When Koma emerged from the meeting, he told us that Mogae had proposed Ian Khama’s name for the Vice Presidency. We were shocked and we looked at each other. That was not what we had agreed at the BNF parliamentary caucus. We asked Koma what he told Mogae. Maitshwarelo Dabutha was particularly hard on Koma, demanding to know what concessions Koma had made and what he expected in return. Koma told us that he promised to support Mogae’s choice because Mogae promised to agree to our proposal for the funding of opposition parties in return.”
According to Koosaletse and Dingake, an altercation ensued and Koma ducked out by calling his guide, Tilman Pilane, to take him home so that he could take his medication. At the time, the BNF was going through its own entirely different crisis. Dingake and ten other BNF parliamentarians were in one faction while Koma and Kebadire Kalake were in the other. The impasse was never resolved but calls on the BNF to support different personalities for the Vice Presidency, added to the Front’s tension. A few weeks later, the two BNF factions were hurling chairs and stones at each other at a gory special congress in Palapye. Dingake, Kosaaletse and nine other MPs broke away to form the Botswana Congress Party.
Recalls Koosaletse: “Khama’s name came as a complete shock to us. So we called in the Attorney General, Phandu Skelemani, to explain if that was possible. Skelemani just looked at us and said, “Ian Khama! Vice President! Muno penga! (Ian Khama! Vice President! You guys are crazy.)”
The other name that was being bandied about in the contest for Vice President was then BDP strongman and National Chairman, Ponatshego Kedikilwe. Although Kedikilwe did not have the numbers in parliament, he had harnessed the whole party structure ÔÇô Central Committee, party youth league and women’s wing ÔÇô to his side. Even newspaper headline writers predicted that pushing Kedikilwe overboard would destabilize the party and possibly the country.
In fact, Nchindo used to regale friends with stories of how Mogae was toying around with the idea of making Kedikilwe his deputy, “until the Tlokweng incident.” By the Tlokweng incident, he was referring to an alleged behind-closed-doors meeting by Kedikilwe and other members of the so called “Big Two” faction held in Tlokweng on the eve of Masire’s departure from State House.
On Wednesday April 1st, Mogae took an oath of office as the third president of Botswana. He immediately announced his Cabinet which ruffled a few feathers. Most of his supporters in the “big Five” faction were hoping Mogae would reward them for standing by him. Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lt Gen Mompati Merafhe, believed to be Mogae’s right hand man is understood to have felt betrayed that Mogae left him at the Department of Foreign Affairs. Although Merafhe was doing well as Minister of Foreign Affairs, each time he went on foreign assignments, he had to watch his back because members of the “Big Two” faction were conniving to steal his constituency in Mahalapye. He was hoping Mogae would assign him a new cabinet post that would keep him at home so that he could keep a close watch on his hard-won constituency.
Assistant Minister of Finance and Development Planning, Jacob Nkate, who is also in the “Big Five” alliance, was not any happier. Mogae was aware of the stormy relationship between Nkate and the new Minister of Finance and Development Planning, Ponatshego Kedikilwe, but he went ahead and appointed Kedikilwe to be Nkate’s boss.
David Magang, a long trusted friend of Mogae got the worst deal. He was moved from the Ministry of Minerals, Energy and Water Affairs where he was pushing for diamond beneficiation. As if that was not enough, he was transferred to the Ministry of Works Transport and Communications.
This despite the fact that he was in the process of suing the ministry transport following an accident which left him crippled while on duty.
The “Big Five” group was also unhappy with Daniel Kwelagobe’s appointment to the Ministry of Local Government Lands and Housing. Kwelagobe’s new posting put him closer to the grassroots and councils, where as every BDP insider knew thrived best. The new assignment gave the BDP Secretary General an unparalleled authority to appoint nominated councilors. There were fears that he would use his new position to increase his following. Lt Gen Ian Khama was appointed Minister of Presidential Affairs. The Botswana Constitution allowed the former army commander to hold a ministerial post without being a Member of Parliament for a period of four months. On the same day, Serowe North MP Roy Blackbeard announced that he would be stepping down. Mogae, however, would not name his choice for the Vice Presidency, saying “an announcement will be made soon.”
Mogae then convened a BDP parliamentary caucus where he announced that he had nominated Lt Gen Khama to be Vice President. “I am lobbying you and from here I am going to lobby Batswana” he is understood to have said.
Although Khama’s choice was opposed by both the “Big Five” and the “Big Two” factions, no one protested the president’s choice to his face, but this was a decision that would define Mogae’s presidency and his relationship with the party.
Khama was brought in to end BDP factions and increase entries in the party membership register. For sometime, most political watchers agreed that the former BDF commander deserved credit for the ease with which he traded his camouflage for the BDP red white and black colours. Some, however, questioned if the Ian Khama makeover was an honourable journey to maturity or just posturing. Who he was would not work in politics, and indications were that he decided to become what he thought voters wanted: a populist.
As BDF commander, he called for a clampdown on the media, went on record saying he did not read local newspapers and even banned one newspaper from circulating at the Sir Seretse Khama barracks in Mogoditshane and Mapharangwane Air Base in Molepolole. As Vice President he decided to correct himself, shed his past and prepare for a season in politics. He restructured the civil service and ensured that every department had a media liaison officer.
He became a regular at the National Stadium when the Zebras were playing and seemed comfortable shaking hands with football fans. However, indications are that he became overwhelmed with the new found love with the press and the public, and bungled the revolution. He flung open his office door to members of the public. He was “the man to see” for anyone with a complaint. This set him against some of his government colleagues who resented his intrusion into their spheres of influence. He fell out with the then Minister of Commerce and Industry, George Kgoroba, when he entertained complaints by BATAB (the Hotel and Tourism Association of Botswana) against the minister. He clashed with the then Labour and Home Affairs Minister, Bahiti Temane, when he started following up on complaints by immigrants who were unhappy with the pace at which their citizenship applications were being processed.
He stepped on the toes of his former boss and Minister of Foreign Affairs Mompati Merafhe when he threatened to resign if recommendations of the Merafhe Commission of MPs salaries were upheld.
When Khama decided to go on a controversial 12 months Sabbatical leave, his colleagues saw an opportunity to get back at him.
Youth League Chairman, Lesang Magang issued a statement denouncing Khama’s Sabbatical leave. The ink on Magang’s statement had hardly dried when another statement, bearing signatures of 11 youth league committee members regretted”the Constitutional precedent being set by the sabbatical leave granted to his honour the Vice President. The honourable action is for the Vice president to resign from his office to solve his personal matter.”
Mogoditshane MP, George Kgoroba, took the president to task over the decision to grant Khama the 12 months leave. Speaking from the parliament floor, he challenged Mogae to explain what other concessions he had made to Khama when he recruited him to be Vice President.
Khama would later charge that, “as a result of the leave, it occurred to me that once again the political daggers were out from several quarters. I will not venture why but what it did demonstrate to me was this: That in politics some will wait to see which way the scales will tip, and you find yourself an outcast on the one hand, and back in the fold on the other, and either of those two situations can also change at the flick of a switch.”
A FEW days before Festus Mogae recalled Khama from leave, and gave him sweeping powers, Khama is understood to have visited Mogae with a close friend-cum-advisor. It may well have been a typical day in the corridors of power. Conspiracy theorists, however, read a deeper meaning into that the meeting between the trio and Mogae’s subsequent statement in parliament: That Khama and Mogae had cut a deal which allowed the Vice President to come back on his own terms.
On the day Khama returned from leave, Mogae reshuffled his Cabinet clearing the path for his Vice President to resume work with enhanced powers.
BDP insiders believe that after the controversial leave, Khama realized that his appeal was waning, and when the MP for Ngwaketse West, Michael Tshipinare, tabled a motion asking government to review MPs salaries, Khama seized the opportunity and pulled out his tried and tested populist card. Khama openly criticized Thipinare’s motion, and once again the gallery cheered and his public approval soured, while his relationship with his colleagues in Parliament cooled.
In a Gabz FM statement, Khama attacked his colleagues for demanding a pay rise. Minister Margaret Nasha garnered the support of her cabinet colleagues to push Mogae to keep his deputy on a tight leash. Apparently worried that Khama would develop a siege mentality, Mogae let the whole thing slide, hoping it would go away.
The dust had hardly settled when Khama dropped the BNPC bombshell, calling his colleagues in parliament “vultures.” In the paper presented at BNPC in the same week that Ponatshego Kedikilwe resigned from Cabinet, Khama stated that, “in the recent confrontation over MPs salaries, I find myself at odds with some of my colleagues on a matter I believe to be one of principle and integrity. It serves to remind me once again that certain aspects of politics, for me anyway, are a far cry from own beliefs…. I promised myself, being weary of what I was coming into, politics, never to abandon what I believe in, even if it means my rather having to abandon politics in order to remain true to my principles. In the discreet world of BDP politics, such contentious issues are usually settled behind closed doors.
Khama had threatened to resign the previous year over findings of a Commission of Inquiry headed by Foreign Affairs Minister, Lt Gen Mompati Merafhe, which recommended that MPs salaries be increased by 95 percent. He decided to stay after Mogae rejected the recommendations.
The BDP leadership, convinced that Mogae could not keep Khama under control, decided to take the task upon themselves. At a Cabinet meeting called to discuss the mid term review of the national development plan, assistant Minister of Finance and Development Planning, Boyce Sebetela, proposed that Khama be brought before the party parliamentary caucus.
Even as BDP upheavals went, the fallout of Kedikilwe’s resignation was difficult to read. With the BDP parliamentary caucus putting finishing touches to its strategy to crucify Khama, the danger of a big shove that could push Khama overboard was becoming more conceivable. Mogae had alienated all party structures, and there were fears that if Khama left, the president’s back would be exposed.
Mogae says “at the close of the meeting, I pointed out that in my judgment the intemperate language used against one another during the debate was regrettable and amounted to mutual affront.”
It is said that at the meeting Minister Temane pointed a finger at Khama and warned his BDP colleagues that they “were breeding a monster.”
As one BDP leader put it, “any president at the beginning of his term stands on very firm ground because his reforming ardor is still potent. But this is not the case with Mogae, who has forfeited respect to the point of political impotence. After allowing Khama to take the one year leave of absence, Mogae now approaches the nation with no moral leverage to demand sacrifice.” The president, who was doted on as an honest man who never made promises he could not keep, seemed to have lost that trump card.
Botswana Alliance Movement Leader, Lepetu Setshwaelo said, “Mogae did not tell the nation the truth when he brought in Khama, and he is not telling us the truth now. This has crippled his presidency because this is a serious breach of faith. The story behind Khama’s one year leave of absence is a concoction and it is going to be very difficult for Mogae to win back the nation’s trust, there is a serious gap of confidence.”
Mogae came across as a diminished president and there was even talk in the party that he was planning to step down before the end of his term.
The BDP parliamentary caucus that was convened to bash Khama forced Mogae to publicly commit himself to completing his two terms in office.
Mogae would later announce in his keynote address at a BDP youth congress held in Tonota over the 2000 President’s Day Holidays that “there is uncertainty that appears to be finding currency about my plans regarding my tenure in office.” He said the speculation had fueled the agitation in the BDP.
As discontentment grew in Mogae’s administration, also drawn into the conflict was the president’s “think-tank”, a clique of influential whisky, gin and tonic drinking mates: Louis Nchindo, Lawrence Lekalake, Richard Mannathoko, Gobe Matenge and Chief Justice Julian Nganunu.
Nchindo was credited with sidelining Magang and Kedikilwe from the Vice Presidency and the appointment of Ian Khama instead. Nchindo is also believed to have been the influence behind Mogae’s initial intransigence to diamond beneficiation, and the redeployment of Magang from the Ministry of Minerals, Energy and Water Affairs where he was lobbying for beneficiation, to the Ministry of Works Transport and Communications.
Matenge on the other hand is understood to have been Mogae’s biggest advisor when Mogae, then Vice President, was grappling with the Dukwi and Mosetse Chieftainship crisis, and later the amendment of the Constitution to make it tribally neutral.
With Mogae alienated from BDP structures, his think tank provided tonic for his bruised soul. They did not hide the fact that they had scant respect for Mogae’s Cabinet. In fact, Nchindo went on record saying Mogae’s Cabinet was failing to run a country with a population of less than 2 million, while Soweto- a South African black township- with a population ten times that of Botswana was run by one person.
