His Excellency (HE) would definitely not want to be the first Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) leader to turn it into an opposition party; nor would he want to be the first one-term state president the country has known. He has therefore ensured that the ruling BDP is united behind him, and is rebuilding party structures across the country. This is aimed at the party clinching its tenth straight electoral victory since independence at the next general elections.
But the Umbrella for Democratic Change (UDC), an opposition coalition, stands in the way. Although the BDP convincingly beat the UDC at the previous general elections, this time around the coalition intends to correct previous mistakes. It is also in talks with the Alliance for Progressives (AP) and the Botswana Patriotic Front (BPF), BDP splinter parties, for them to join the coalition. If this happens, which is likely, the UDC would pose a serious threat to the ruling party.
However, the coalition is currently in turmoil – major cracks have appeared between the coalition itself and its biggest affiliate party, the Botswana Congress Party (BCP). As a result, the UDC and the BCP recently competed against each other at Bophirima Ward by-election in Gaborone. The two are at it again at Moselewapula Ward by-election in Francistown.
After publicly disparaging the coalition leadership for lack of good governance, the UDC recently slapped the BCP president and secretary general with a three-month suspension, and requested the duo to apologise for the infraction, which they said they would not do. The suspension led to the BCP president losing his position as leader of the opposition in parliament, and was replaced by another BCP MP who, together with four other BCP MPs, were also suspended and then expelled from the BCP. This has resulted in divisions within the BCP and furthering the rift between the UDC and its affiliate party.
It is to be seen how the UDC deals with the schism, however, given what is at stake, chances are that it will eventually reconcile with the BCP.
As indicated, the coalition lost dismally to the BDP at the 2019 general elections. The ruling party wiped off hitherto UDC strongholds in the southern part of the country (south of Dibete, excluding Kgalagadi constituencies), with the coalition leader losing his seat in Gaborone. In addition to the nine it already controlled, the BDP won fourteen parliamentary seats that had been won by the opposition in 2014. The winning margins were also remarkable. The ruling party increased its winning margins in constituencies in the south from a total of 11,270 (in 2014) to 124,875 votes, a growth of more than 1000%. It was a massacre. With 11,432 votes, Moshupa-Manyana constituency scored the biggest winning margin.
The election results in the south shocked the opposition, especially since its two biggest parties had joined forces for the first time. The expectation was that, with the active support of former BDP and state president, it would be a walkover for the coalition. It was not be.
The coalition attributed its loss to vote rigging by the BDP in the south of the country, which the party vehemently denied. Some BNF activists blame the BCP for voting the BDP in the south in order to annihilate other parties in the coalition, something that the BCP refutes. Without any evidence of vote rigging and the BCP’s collusion, and since the government’s performance in the south was not any different from the rest of the country, the white wash can only be attributed to a desire for a state president from the south.
Among the four state presidents since independence (before HE Rre Masisi), three of them came from the north. In fact, two of the state presidents were Bangwato Dikgosi, a father and son (the first president and the immediate past president). Of the four, only one came from the south. In other words, before the ascendance of HE Rre Masisi to the presidency, the north had provided the country with three quarters of state presidents.
In 2019, the immediate past state president quit the ruling party and joined the BPF as its patron and formed an informal pact with the UDC. He vowed to dislodge HE Rre Masisi from the presidency, and backed the presidential candidacy of the UDC leader, another northerner. The southerners were incensed; it was high time a state president came from the south. The attractive UDC manifesto failed to sway the southerners from these sentiments. They were in no mood for anything else but the election of a state president from the south.
Hence, the overwhelming endorsement of the BDP in the south so that HE Rre Masisi could become state president. This was the reason for the huge margin in Moshupa-Manyana, the president’s home constituency. The opposition failed to read the mood on the ground in this part of the country, and paid the cost.
However, with a full term in office for HE Rre Masisi, the sentiment of voting a southerner to be state president would have somewhat worn off by the next general elections. It is also likely that the rhetoric by the former state president to end the presidency of the incumbent would be toned down to placate southerners.
Concerns in the south as in rest of the country are increasingly turning to soaring living costs, which are exacerbated by the West’s financial and economic sanctions against Russia for its invasion of Ukraine. With no end of the military conflict in sight, the electorate will still be grappling with living costs by the next general elections.
Consequently, the southern part of the country may not give the ruling party the backing it did in 2019, as living costs trump sentiments. Also, on the back of tribal affiliation, the BPF would have made significant inroads in the BDP constituencies in central district. All in all, the ruling party is likely to shed support. So how does it shore it up for the general elections, in light of the possibility that the opposition may retain the seats it currently holds?
The BDP government invariably revises and bolsters national policies, programmes and service delivery in order to address existing and emerging socio-economic problems, including living costs. However, since this is routine, and given the limited public finances, it would be insufficient considering the political challenges the party will face at the ballot. Nor would revamping party structures for focussed political campaigns be that helpful since opposition parties will also do the same. The party can therefore fast-track increasing its national footprint through a pact of sorts with existing parties in the opposition.
All opposition parties aspire to replace the ruling party, and disparages it in order to garner public support, which is expected. Leaders of these parties derive a certain level of prestige from being at the helm of their political parties. However, the biggest desire and ultimate gratification for any politician is access to state coffers. A BDP electoral victory in 2024 would postpone this access for the opposition, yet again. Undoubtedly, the opposition is weary of being on the losing side.
Therefore, it would not be such a difficult task for the BDP to convince some of the opposition parties to form an electoral pact as they are unlikely to be averse to sharing state power. There are five opposition parties with representation in parliament – the BNF, BCP, BPF, AP and BPP. Any of these can be approached by the ruling party for an electoral pact. Hereunder is a brief assessment of each and the viability of a pact.
BNF: Its president is also the president of the UDC. He won’t stand for a parliamentary seat in 2024 but will be the UDC presidential candidate. He is fixated on unseating HE Rre Masisi as state president. For this reason, the BNF will not agree to a pact. Verdict: not viable.
BPF: Its leader has fallen out with his successor to the extent that he is now on a self-imposed exile in South Africa. Forming a pact with the party would quash the presence of the UDC in central district. However, a pact will only be possible if the leaders of the two parties can find peace. At the moment a pact is impossible. Verdict: not viable
BPP: It is an affiliate of the UDC and supposedly close to the BNF. Overtures of a pact would therefore not be welcome. Verdict: not viable.
BCP: A UDC affiliate, the party is currently embroiled in a political fight with the UDC, and is ready to bolt out if there is a viable alternative. Its leader, alleged to be ambitious, is also the vice president of the UDC. The highest position he can attain in the coalition is vice president of the country, that is, if the UDC wins in 2024, which is not guaranteed. Although leaving the UDC and joining the ruling party would result in the party losing some support, it would nevertheless ensure a BDP win. A pact with the BCP would be a tactical master stroke. Right now, the party would like nothing better than cock a nook at the UDC. Verdict: viable
AP: It traces its origins to the first breakup of the BDP, which spawned the Botswana Movement for Democracy (BMD), from which it split. It is close to the BCP and has an electoral pact of sorts with it for by-elections. Its leaders were the young Turks at the BDP who were expelled or left because of a disagreement with the then party president, who has since joined the opposition. Thus, returning to the BDP would not be such a cultural shock. Its leaders seem lost in opposition politics; they are used to winning. Although its support is not significant, its president is most sought after in local politics. He would add significant political capital to the BDP’s campaign. Verdict: viable
Thus, only the BCP and AP could be approached by the BDP for meaningful discussions regarding an electoral pact for the 2024 general elections. The pact could possibly be preceded by a brief governing coalition as a trust-building measure and a trial for post elections governance. BCP and AP followers would be informed that it is better to implement some of their parties’ initiatives than to be in the opposition and implement none. Also, as part of government, the two parties would be able to deal with the public corruption that they currently allege.
