The headline of your article “Poachers initiated ‘shoot-to-kill’ policy against BDF” (Sunday Standard in-depth 15 – 21 November 2020) is incorrect. The ‘shoot-to-kill’ policy was initiated a long time ago and by the Botswana Defence Force itself. The BDF’s involvement in anti-poaching started in a small way in the Chobe National Park in 1980 following a request by the then Game Warden at Kasane, Mr David Peacock. A meeting was held in the D.C.’s office in Kasane, attended by: –
• The D.C., then Mr Edward Kgagole • Brigadier (as he then was) Ian Khama, 2nd in Command of the BDF • The Officer Commanding No. 9 District, Botswana Police • Commanding Officer, BDF Kazungula • Game Warden, Kasane, Mr D Peacock • Mr Pat Carr-Hartley, Hunters Africa
I was a District Officer at the time. I did not attend the meeting but was briefed on what had transpired by Mr Kgagole and Mr Peacock. The main issue discussed was incursions into the Chobe National Park by South African Defence Force personnel to poach. The SADF had killed several elephants in the park and had used SADF helicopters to cross the river and take the ivory back to the Caprivi. I was an eye-witness to some of this activity. It was agreed that the BDF would patrol the river front to deter the SADF from crossing the river.
At that time there was some cross-border poaching over the river by Caprivians hunting for meat. The main target species were buffalo and lechwe but other species were hunted too. This was not considered a serious problem and it was left to DWNP personnel to deal with it.So far as I know, the Commissioner of Police did not then and has not subsequently ever asked the BDF to assist the civil power to conduct anti-poaching operations. In terms of section 174(1) of the Botswana Defence Force Act, only the Commissioner of Police has the power to request the BDF to so act.In 1986, the BDF became more actively involved in anti-poaching activities following an upsurge in poaching of elephant and rhino for ivory and horn respectively. This happened all over Eastern and Southern Africa in response to large increases in the price of these commodities.
Poaching gangs, initially mainly from Zambia made incursions into Botswana initially to hunt rhino. The last truly indigenous Black Rhino in Botswana was killed in 1987 and most of the re-introduced White Rhino were also killed in this period. Caprivians were also crossing the border to poach in this period but they were often hunting for meat rather than rhino horn or ivory. It appears that the Department of Wildlife and National Parks asked the BDF for help as they were unable to cope with the situation.The BDF soon adopted a policy of shooting suspected poachers on sight. In January 1991, Lt Gen. Ian Khama told the committee of the Kalahari Conservation Society in my presence that the BDF had adopted a policy of “not arresting poachers” as they had found it to be “a waste of time”. He said that the BDF had found that men who were arrested and brought before court were back in the field poaching again “the next week”.
Although Lt Gen. Khama then denied that BDF anti-poaching patrols have orders to “shoot to kill” at suspected poachers, I have been told over the years by other BDF officers and men that they do have such orders. Between 1987 and mid-1990 BDF anti-poaching patrols shot 15 people dead. So far as I have been able to ascertain, no-one was wounded and they made no arrests during this period. The deaths of nine of these 15 people were reported in the press. In January 1988 ‘The Gazette’ reported that four alleged poachers had been shot in the Linyanti area in November 1987 and in November 1988 ‘The Gazette’ reported that a further five alleged poachers had been killed in the previous year. The paper’s source was Mr K. Mogatle, then Assistant Director in DWNP.
In October 1988, the BDF ordered all civilians to leave the Linyanti and Kwando areas and conducted an “anti-poaching” sweep. At this time, the BDF delivered the bodies of three persons to the mortuary at Maun hospital. BDF personnel told the mortuary staff that the three had been killed on an” anti-poaching” operation. All three had been shot in the back and the bodies were stripped naked and all means of identification removed. One of the bodies was of a boy estimated by a doctor to be about 12 years old while another was of another boy estimated by the same doctor to be about 15. Inevitably, violence begets more violence. Towards the end of 1990, a BDF patrol opened fire on a party of alleged poachers, killing two. One of the bodies fell into the Chobe river and was not recovered.
A few days later, a BDF patrol in the same area was fired on from the Namibian bank and one soldier was killed. These incidents were widely reported in the press. The BDF then laid an ambush at the site from which they shot two more men who came to pick up some clothing that was lying on the ground at the site of the previous shooting. My informant was told by Lt. Gen Khama that the BDF had orders to shoot to kill in both instances. The Namibian government made a formal diplomatic protest about these killings and a meeting was held at the site of the second killing. During this meeting the BDF “discovered” an AK47 at the scene. It is surprising that the Namibian Police, who had earlier conducted a search of the scene, did not find this rifle. I confronted Lt. Gen Khama over these killings at a meeting of the Committee of the Kalahari Conservation Society in January 1991. In response, Lt. Gen Khama said that: –
• Four ‘poachers’ had been killed, • No arrests had been made, • The BDF “gave up” arresting poachers in 1986, • The BDF has “permission” from government for its actions, • BDF patrols challenge suspects to stop and shoot if they fail to comply, • The BDF only shoots non-citizens who are identified as such by their ability (or otherwise) to speak Setswana.
In response to what Lt Gen Khama had to say, I pointed out that:
• It was odd that no-one had been wounded or arrested, • Shooting suspects without trial is contrary to a basic principle of the rule of law, • Shooting fleeing persons is unlawful in Botswana, and • The actions of the BDF were tantamount to murder.
Amongst those present at the meeting and still alive are: Mr D.N. Moroka, Mr A.B. Masalila, Mr N Fitt and Mrs E Patterson. The late Louis Nchindo used to tease me by introducing me to newcomers as “the man who called Ian Khama a murderer!’ The law in Botswana is very clear in that a person may shoot to kill (or otherwise use deadly force) in defence of human life where no reasonable alternative course of action exists. In certain circumstances, it may also be lawful to shoot to kill in defence of property. However, in our law, wild animals are deemed to be “ferae naturae” and are not property unless lawfully killed or captured so it is not lawful to use deadly force to protect them. Since 1991 more than 40 more people have been shot and killed by anti-poaching patrols, They include a man found skinning a giraffe who ran away leaving his rifle and was shot in the back, a 19 year old young woman cut in half by automatic fire while sitting in a mokoro in the middle of the Linyanti river and a nine year old boy killed on Namibian soil.
It is instructive to compare what is happening here with the British Army’s actions in Northern Ireland during the “troubles” there. The situation in Northern Ireland then was far more dangerous both to the safety of the soldiery and to the integrity of the state than the situation in Northern Botswana. The IRA were actively trying to kill as many British soldiers as possible and to forcibly separate Northern Ireland from the United Kingdom.All British soldiers were issued with the “Yellow Card” and required to carry it at all times while on duty. Not to carry it was a punishable offence. The “Yellow Card” reads as follows: –
Instructions for opening fire in Northern IrelandGeneral Rules
1: In all situations you are to use the minimum force necessary.
FIREARMS MUST ONLY BE USED AS A LAST RESORT
2: Your weapon must always be made safe: that is, NO live round is to be carried in the breech and in the case of automatic weapons the working parts are to be forward, unless you are ordered to carry a live round in the breech or you are about to fire.
Challenging
3: A challenge MUST be given before opening fire unless:
a to do so would increase the risk of death or grave injury to you or any other person. b you or others in the immediate vicinity are being engaged by terrorists.
4: You are to challenge by shouting:
‘ARMY: STOP OR I FIRE’ or words to that effect.
Opening Fire
5: You may only open fire against a person:
a: If he* is committing or about to commit an act LIKELY TO ENDANGER LIF AND THERE IS NO OTHER WAY TO PREVENT THE DANGER. The following are some examples of acts where life could be endangered, dependent always upon the circumstances:
1: Firing or being about to fire a weapon 2: Planting, detonating or throwing an explosive device (including a petrol bomb) 3: deliberately driving a vehicle at a person and there is no other way of stopping him;*
b: If you know that he has just killed or injured any person by such means and he does not surrender if challenged and THERE IS NO OTHER WAY TO MAKE AN ARREST.
6: If you have to open fire you should:
a Fire only aimed shots b Fire no more rounds than necessary c Take all reasonable precautions not to injure anyone other than your target
* ‘She’ can be read instead of ‘he’ if applicable.
After every incident in which a soldier fired a weapon, the hard-eyed men of the Army’s Special Investigation Branch conducted an investigation. They were not to be trifled with and were rightly feared by the ordinary soldiers. Their investigations were thorough, impartial and they instituted action against any soldier they deemed to have breached the rules. It is clear that the intention of the British army, not always realised in practice, was to minimise loss of life consequent to its operations. This is in accordance with the principles of British law, which is basically the same as our law, concerning he use of lethal force. This does not appear to be the intention of the BDF in its anti-poaching operations.
The British army killed 307 individuals (only half of whom were paramilitaries) during the troubles and suffered 722 fatal casualties itself. This represents a kill ratio of 0.425 to one. In addition, at least 27,000 people were arrested by the British army during the troubles. By contrast, so far as I am aware, only one BDF soldier has been killed by suspected poachers while 60 suspected poachers have been killed by the BDF. This represents a kill ratio of 60 to one. In Zimbabwe, during the anti-rhino poaching campaign of the 1980’s and 1990’s some 900 poachers were killed and 18 members of anti-poaching patrols were killed by poachers, a kill ratio of 50 to one. These very high kill ratios in anti-poaching operations and the paucity of arrests are a clear indication of the true nature of these operations. They are basically campaigns of state authorised murder. Moreover, they are ineffective – in Zimbabwe in spite of the intensive anti-poaching campaign and the large number of casualties, rhinos were effectively exterminated as a free-ranging wild species. In Botswana, cross-border incursions by poaching gangs do not appear to be curbed by the draconian measures being implemented.
The reasons for this state of affairs are not hard to seek. The perpetrators of rhino and ivory poaching are under-educated young men from rural backgrounds who can see no way of legitimately improving their lives and enhancing their lives. They have enough education to see that an alternative and, to them better, life is possible but they are blocked from achieving it by a combination of underdevelopment economies, inadequate education and poor government policy. There is an inexhaustible supply of such young people and killing them in the name of conservation does not deter others from stepping forward to try their luck. The late Don Heath maintained that the elimination of just four individuals, two traders in Lusaka and two senior officials in Zimbabwe would have stopped the rhino poaching onslaught stone dead.
In short, the “shoot-to-kill” policy is illegal, immoral, inhumane and ineffective. A rethink is called for.
